Introduction
Over recent years, the concept of global liquidity has become a matter of concern. If traditionally, analyses focused on the impact of growing liquidity deriving from the ease of monetary conditions on aggregate demand, others studies have been interested in the impact of global liquidity on asset prices, essentially at country-levels. Given the increasing degree of financial integration including financial innovations during the last fifteen years, coupled with the high degree of capital mobility, monetary expansion in advanced economies, resulting in an environment of generally low interest rates, gives rise to an increase in global liquidity encouraging international investors to favor carry-trades opportunities. These strategies coming from investors seeking for higher yields promote strong capital flows from those markets to emerging markets exhibiting higher interest rates and stronger economic development prospects. Non-resident investors may also benefit from exposure to appreciating foreign currencies.
However, the surge of capital inflows to emerging markets may have some harmful consequences for financial stability. A related strand of literature has pointed out the strong implications of global liquidity on financial stability, in particular in relation to investors' risk appetite and the high level of volatility that characterizes cross-border capital flows (European Central Bank, 2011) . In a context of abundant global liquidity and the accompanying decline in risk aversion, strong capital inflows from international investors searching higher yield would likely have an impact on domestic financing conditions and exert upward pressures on exchange rates and asset prices in emerging markets receiving those flows. Indeed, to prevent their currencies from an excessive appreciation and a deterioration of cost-competitiveness, central banks in emerging markets economies have been incited to pursue or reinforce foreign exchange accumulation. These foreign exchange interventions have forced monetary authorities to create additional money to absorb those dollar hal-00740102, version 1 -9 Oct 2012 inflows. The result was an increase in the monetary base of these countries which was sometimes transferred to the real economy through an increase in domestic credit supply.
The strong volatility of these capital flows, essentially in the form of portfolio investments, raises also concerns about sudden-stop episodes or capital outflows which may threaten financial stability in several different ways. First, during episodes of inflows, emerging markets face upward pressures on asset and real estate prices, sometimes well-above fundamental values, and on exchange rates leading to undesired real exchange rate appreciation which undermines competitive gains. Second, those inflows bring funding costs lower which encourage the financial and non-financial private sector in emerging market economies to increase its debt leverage fueling balance sheet mismatches (i.e. a deterioration of the debt/equity ratio). It raises the issue of financial instability in the event of a wave of risk aversion leading to a dramatic withdrawal of capital and a sudden hike in funding costs. Third, a large part of bond issues and cross-border banking credits appear to be denominated in dollars, also with a short maturity, causing foreign currency and maturity mismatches on balance sheets of the private sector. They expose non-exporting companies (whose revenue flows are likely to be denominated in local currency) to the risk of depreciation in the local currency but also to the risk of funding liquidity. Finally, other than the potential risks of capital inflows on financial instability, they also curb monetary policy management in emerging markets countries. Authorities are hesitant to continue tightening the monetary conditions even if inflationary pressure persists. Central Bank interventions to limit an appreciation of their currencies are also accompanied by an expansion of the monetary base (because interventions are not fully sterilized), encouraging the distribution of credit and thus feeding inflationary pressures.
Conversely, episodes of sudden stops of inflows (in worst case episodes of sudden withdrawal) are also a factor of financial instability by their negative impacts on funding costs (cf. infra) and on the path of exchange rates. Countries that rely heavily on external funding to finance their economic activity hal-00740102, version 1 -9 Oct 2012 are the most exposed to sudden stops with higher risks of economic contraction. Generally speaking, the volatility of capital flows indirectly influences economic activity by increasing uncertainty that weighs heavily on choices on investment and consumption of both businesses and households. The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview and some stylized facts about global liquidity and several measures to assess periods of excess global liquidity.
Section 3 presents a review of existing literature on the impact of global liquidity in terms of financial instability. Section 4 presents our data set as well as our empirical model, including details on methodology to construct our global liquidity indicator. Results on econometric tests are detailed on section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Measures of global excess liquidity
The concept of global liquidity could be defined as the aggregate of domestic liquidity that can be used for payments and transfers for current international transactions. Set against this background, the concept of external convertibility of the currency is important as it can influence the liquidity at the domestic level of others countries.
During the last global financial crisis, the excess of global liquidity combined with liquidity shortfalls on financial markets fuelled a "liquidity paradox" (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2009 ). This points out the (twofold) multiple dimensions of liquidity: the monetary versus market and funding concepts. Monetary liquidity traditionally refers to the official liquidity and can be defined according to the BIS as the "funding that is unconditionally available to settle claims through central banks" (Bank of International Settlement, 2011) . In this sense monetary liquidity represents overall funding conditions in the whole economy. Conversely market and funding liquidity broadly refers to the private liquidity, i.e.
created by the financial and non-financial sectors through cross-border operations (BIS, 2011). More precisely, market liquidity can be defined as the ease to trade financial assets (i.e. without created disruptions on these prices) whereas funding liquidity generally represents the ease for financial institutions to obtain funding. For our purpose, we will focus particularly on monetary liquidity.
Contributions to the literature provide several indicators to assess this concept of global liquidity. In particular, two categories of indicators can be identified: quantitative measures and price measures.
The main quantitative measures include monetary aggregates and credit aggregates. The former can be viewed as an extension of liquidity measures at the domestic level. Baks & Kramer (1999) proposed several aggregate indicators for the G-7 countries, based on narrow and broad money, using three different methods (GDP-weighted and unweighted growth rate of both narrow and broad money and lastly Divisia indices of global money growth).
Domestic credit (scaled by GDP) was also used as quantitative measure of global liquidity as it can be considered as the major counterpart of money supply (Gouteron & Szpiro (2005) ).
In addition, global liquidity can be proxied by reserve money and/or foreign exchange reserves.
Artus & Virard (2010) define global liquidity as "the money created by central banks around the world",
i.e. all monetary bases. Another strand of literature focuses on foreign exchange reserves to assess global liquidity 3 , where they could sometimes be associated with reserve money of advanced economies (Darius & Radde (2010) and De Nicolo & Wiegand (2007) ). Indeed, these measures take into account the increasing role of liquidity created by emerging market economies.
Based on these various indicators, norms have been established to distinguish periods of global excess liquidity to shortage liquidity periods. The leading works on this topic are largely based on those of Baks & Kramer (1999) . They consider as a norm for global liquidity the rate of GDP growth in the economy. This threshold relies on the quantitative theory of money expressed by M.V = P.Y, with M the total amount of money in circulation in a country during a defined period, V the turnover in the money supply, i.e. the transactions velocity of money, Y the real output and P the corresponding price level.
Following the hypothesis of a relatively stable velocity of money related to the quantity theory of money, we get after linearization and differentiation of the last equation:
With t m the excess money growth observed, t m the growth rate of money in the economy and t g the growth rate of GDP. Thereby, the threshold of excess liquidity may be defined when the growth in money supply exceeds the growth rate of GDP.
As underlined by Gouteron & Szpiro (2005) , this threshold represents the one required for the "normal" economic development of the economy without creating a situation of overheating. In other words, it is the level of liquidity compatible with the objective of price stability.
Other measures of excess liquidity have been used such as the money overhang, which represents the deviation between the actual level of money supply expressed in nominal terms with an equilibrium value being a function of long-term demand for money. A combination of this indicator and that of Baks & Kramer (1999) is the real money gap. It represents the deviation of the actual quantity of hal-00740102, version 1 -9 Oct 2012 money in real terms. This is based on the quantitative theory of money and incorporates a specification of the velocity of circulation of money (Berger and Harjes, 2009 ). Other indicators are based on credit, featuring notably the differential in the rate of growth of credit and that of GDP. Another measure, the credit gap, is proposed by Borio & Lowe (2002) . A credit gap is defined when "the ratio of credit to GDP deviates from its tendency towards a specific value". According to these authors, the deviation (measured by the variance of the ratio) must exceed four percentage points from its trend to be described as excessive. The method used to determine the threshold is drawn from the works of Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) .
Besides these quantitative indicators, price indicators can be considered. There is a fairly close relationship between prices and quantities. De Nicolo & Wiegand (2007) propose an indicator of global excess liquidity based on the deviation of short-term nominal interest rate from the Taylor rate. The
Taylor rate results from reactions of monetary authorities to output gap and inflation differential and reveals the preference of central banks underlying the conduct of monetary policy. Therefore, the gap between this threshold (Taylor rate) and the short run nominal interest rate could reflect an excess of money supply, if the current rate is below the Taylor rate. A second approach is presented by Gouteron & Szpiro (2005) . According to them, excess of monetary liquidity would be assessed by the difference between the short term real interest rate and the natural interest rate deriving from the long run growth.
We have constructed several indicators in order to assess the possible excess of global liquidity.
The first ones define the excess liquidity as a ratio of a monetary aggregate to nominal GDP (Figure 1 ). , it seems that global liquidity stayed fairly stable up to 1995 and has increased sharply from this date. This is confirmed with the indicators based on the growth differential between money supply and GDP (figure 2). We use several indicators named ELIM0, ELIM1 and ELIM3 (respectively the differences between the growth rates of M0, M1 and M3 aggregates and the growth rate of GDP in industrialised countries), and the growth rate of foreign currency reserves (ELIFX). In the same way, we calculate the differential between the growth rate of the "world" monetary base and the growth rate of the "world" nominal GDP (World elim0).
M0, M1 and
Indicators of excess liquidity provide overall confirmation of this breaking point in the trend.
Prior to 1995, excess liquidity was relatively low and only for rather brief periods. These surpluses were accompanied by, fairly cyclically, declines in liquidity or even deficits. As regards indicators based on M1 or M3 aggregate, surplus liquidity followed a path around 0 and fluctuations appears to be relatively weaker than those observed few years later. The same pattern is evident in terms of foreign exchange reserves. Before 1995, the growth rate in foreign exchange reserves increased slowly and even
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decreased for oil-exporting countries. The decline in oil prices as from 1980 had been followed by a slow down of foreign currency reserves. Since 1995, foreign currency reserves have risen exponentially with the development of Brazil, India and China and the huge oil revenues generated by OPEC countries. These countries with current account surpluses along with Japan have thus considerable available resources that can earn a return on the capital markets.
Lastly, turning to monetary bases, once again the charts indicate that the phases of surplus liquidity are becoming more frequent and wider than the phases of a liquidity deficit, and also that imbalances are growing over time.
The impact of global excess liquidity on emerging economies
In a global environment characterized by excess liquidity, which can be attributed in large part to monetary easing in advanced countries, international investors increase their demand for higherreturn assets to optimize the risk-return ratio of their portfolio. This excess liquidity encouraged capital flows to emerging markets, leading upward pressures, sometimes excessive on both asset prices and exchange rates in these countries.
To what extent excess liquidity can encourage international investors to search for higher yields, driving asset prices up, especially in emerging markets? Few studies have tackled this question. Most of them focused on the impact of global liquidity on output, inflation and asset prices using VAR models, though only for advanced economies. Sousa and Zaghini (2008) showed that a shock on global liquidity in the G5 countries has a positive impact on real GDP, but only in the short run. The impact on aggregate prices is positive only with a lag. These results are confirmed by those obtained in a single country framework. Back and Kramer (1999) find for the G7 countries that global excess liquidity has a negative hal-00740102, version 1 -9 Oct 2012
impact on real interest rates but a positive impact on equity prices. They also emphasize cross-country spill-over effects on stock returns and interest rates of a shock on liquidity in a given country. Rüffer and Stracca (2006) also examine the cross-border transmission effects of global excess liquidity, which they find to be significant and positive on production and on broad money in the euro zone and in Japan, though not in the US. They suggest, as did Grilli and Roubini (1995) that the US could be a "leader" internationally as the economy seems to be insulated from a global monetary shock. Belke et al. (2010) studied the interaction between global liquidity and the level of goods and asset prices for eleven OECD countries. Whereas monetary aggregates provide leading information on property prices, gold prices and global GDP deflator, equity prices do not react to liquidity shocks. These results are in line with Giese and Tuxen (2007) who showed that global liquidity has an impact on property prices but not on stock prices. Darius and Radde (2010) , also find for the G7 countries that global liquidity provide useful information on property prices -although domestic variables play a more significant role than global variables-though not on equity prices (based on the MSCI world index). All these analyses were conducting by using VAR models and impulse functions.
Studies concerning the impact of liquidity on emerging countries are rather scarce and more recent. Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) hal-00740102, version 1 -9 Oct 2012
Empirical analysis
We investigate the impact of surplus global liquidity on a set of prices for a sample group of 16 emerging economies in Latin America and Asia (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore) over a period from 1990 to 2010 with a monthly frequency 5 .
We collect data on monetary bases (i.e. M0) for a large sample including both advanced and emerging market countries 6 . All data are drawing from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. As monetary bases are expressed in local currencies, we convert all time series in the same unit by using nominal exchange rates against dollar measured at the end of each month. Finally we create a series called the "world" monetary base by simply summing monetary bases for all countries of our sample for each period. The "world" monetary base is expressed in billion dollars. We also create a series called "world" GDP by summing nominal GDPs for our set of countries expressed in dollar terms for each period. In order to study the spillover effects of the global monetary base, we do not include the contribution of the 16 emerging countries to the world monetary base.
Then we construct two indicators of excess global liquidity at the aggregate level. The first one is calculated as the differential between the growth rate of the "world" monetary base and the growth rate of the "world" nominal GDP. The second one is calculated as the ratio of "world" monetary base to "world" nominal GDP expressed in percentage.
In order to identify international transmission of monetary shocks, we used a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model, developed by I. Love and L. Ziccino (2006) . This model allow for individual heterogeneity in the levels of the variables by introducing fixed effects (µ i ). It can be written as:
5 But data for some countries are available only on a shorter sample. 6 The sample includes United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark, and the euro zone for advanced countries. For emerging countries, we include China, South Africa and ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe including Russia and Turkey. The sample comprises also three oil exporting countries, i.e. Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
hal-00740102, version 1 -9 Oct 2012 emerging countries under investigation. We order the monetary variable first because it is expected to be more exogenous with respect to the other variables in the short run. In a spillover analysis it is assumed that domestic factors lag behind global factors (Darius and Radde, 2010) . The increase of global liquidity is likely to be associated with a rise in aggregate demand and will thus increase the prices of several assets: housing, equity, commodities and consumer goods. For each of the 16 emerging countries, we collect data on real GDP (GDP), a consumer price index (cpi), a house price index (house) 7 and a asset price index (stock). Moreover we include the CRB commodity index (crb), which is a basket of internationally traded commodities, including oil. The Cholesky ordering of our variables follows the literature and the relative sluggishness of variables' response to shocks. In particular, it is standard to order output and prices before equity and property prices (Belke et al. 2010 ; Souza, Zaghini 2008) .
Helmert transformation is used in order to remove the individual effects (µ i ) (ie the difference between each variable and its forward mean) 8 . It preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors. We have also removed the country time dummy variables (χ t ) by subtracting the means of each variable calculated for each country year 9 . Coefficients are estimated by GMM, lagged regressors being used as instruments.
A quarter order PVAR has been estimated using monthly data from January 1990 until December 2010. In order to compute impulse respond function, we identify the shocks using Choleski 7 The data on residential property price are not always comparable across countries. 8 See Arellano, Bover (1995) . 9 Countries specific time dummies capturate country specific macro shocks. . However, the negative response of the CRB index is rather surprising. As expected, as the supply of house is inelastic relative to other assets, its price reacts more strongly, at least in the short term (Darius, Radde, 2010) . This contrasts with the relationship between global excess liquidity and consumer goods prices, which are more supply elastic. The short term cpi response is weaker.
Finally, we present the variance decomposition analysis up to 30 months, using the same choleski ordering. Table 1 indicates the percent of the variation of one variable that is explained by a (one standard deviation) shock in another variable, the excess global liquidity here, accumulated over time. The forecast error variance decomposition shows that the contribution of unexpected monetary shocks is rather limited in the short run, but increases over time. Global excess liquidity explains almost 20% of total variation of commodities prices and stock prices 30 periods ahead (2.5 years). The response of real estate prices is significantly lower.
hal-00740102, version 1 -9 Oct 2012 Finally, our results are broadly in line with previous studies. We found evidence of spillover from excess global liquidity to economic conditions in emerging countries. Global liquidity shocks matter for price and output fluctuations. However, the relationship with asset prices (which includes commodity, property and equity) appears weaker.
Conclusion
The global excess liquidity, regardless of the indicators used, increased from the mid-ninety, hal-00740102, version 1 -9 Oct 2012
